

13 August 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Indochina Division

SUBJECT : Military Proselyting Paper

25X1 1. The draft of the Military Proselyting Paper now in St/P has been coordinated with OCI [redacted] ~~ONE~~ (Bobby Layton), and SAVA [redacted]. This means that we have full agreement with in the DDI and from the relevant DCI Staff elements.

*considered* 2. I believe we are now at the point where we can say that we have a complete airing of FE views on the paper and that we should publish the paper and transmit it to Dr. Kissinger forthwith. In his memorandum to Dr. Kissinger of 25 June 1970, the DCI agreed to forward the paper "as soon as --- completed." Dr. Kissinger's original request for such a paper, of course, predates that memorandum.

3. The DCI's 25 June 1970 memorandum included an eight page attachment discussion of Communist Subversive Efforts in South Vietnam. This discussion included all of the most significant findings in the Military Proselyting paper in addition to other material. DDP/FE participated in the drafting of that discussion and agreed to it before transmittal to Dr. Kissinger. The Military Proselyting paper is essentially an amplification of those findings. (The 25 June memorandum is attached.)

25X1 4. On 29 June 1970, [redacted] forwarded detailed VNO comments on the paper to [redacted] (Attached) We have made every effort possible to incorporate the views expressed in this memorandum. You will find margin notes on the memorandum which show how we made many of the changes.

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5. [ ] and I had a meeting with [ ] and [ ] on the paper. [ ] is in VNO; [ ] is in CI now, but had been detailed to VNO. It was clear to me as a result of that meeting that FE has fundamental problems with the DDI addressing the subject in any way. For example, we were asked specifically to delete the entire section on the GVN's problems. [ ] and I explained that an assessment of the Communist's military proselyting effort would be incomplete with out that discussion and in any event, Dr. Kissinger's request would not be fulfilled without it. It also was clear to us that neither [ ] had any serious objections to the paper as analysts and that goes for the GVN problem and response as well as the Viet Cong effort. I communicated these obserbations to [ ] and George Carver on the day of the meeting.

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6. We also had additional written comments from [ ] which we largely incorporated. (Attached.)

7. Clearly the problem here is the subject matter. I think this is a sound and carefull report on a rather difficult subject.

[ ]  
Chief, South Vietnam Branch

Attachments

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